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MARKET LIBERALIZATION AND 
FOOD SECURITY IN MALI
J. Dione and J. Staatz *
INTRODUCTION
Since 1981 Mali has been fundamentally restructuring its economy, aimed at 
placing greater reliance on the market as a coordinating mechanism, redefin­
ing the state’s role in the economy, and stabilising macroeconomic variables 
such as the balance of payments, the government budget, the rate of infla­
tion, and the growth of national income. This structural adjustment process 
has involved a broad range of activities, including rewriting of the commer­
cial and fiscal codes. The centerpiece of the reforms has been the liberal­
ization of the cereal markets, under the multi-donor financed Cereal Market 
Restructuring Project, known by its French acronym, PRMC.
This paper describes the background and goals of the PRMC, evaluates its 
performance during its first six years, discuss the role of food security re­
search in informing the reform process, and draws implications from the Ma­
lian experience for the design of market liberalization and related policy 
research elsewhere in Africa.
BACKGROUND TO THE PRMC
A short history o f agricultural policy in Mali
Mali is among the poorest countries in the world, with a 1985 per capita 
GNP estimated at US$150 (World Bank, 1987, p. 202). The physical resource 
base is perhaps the most diverse of any Sahelian country, ranging from the 
Sahara desert in the north (which covers approximately 65% of the country’s 
total area) to Sudano-Guinean areas in the south receiving over 1,400 mm of 
rainfall per year. Dryland agriculture and livestock raising employ the bulk 
of the population. Irrigated farming, flood-recession agriculture, and fishing 
are important along the country’s three major rivers—the Niger, the Bani, 
and the Senegal.
Approximately 70% of total calories in the Malian diet come from cereals, 
with millet, maize and sorghum accounting for about 85% of the cereal cal-
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ories. Rice, of which approximately 50% is imported, is produced mainly in 
government-organized perimeters such as the Office du Niger, and is widely- 
consumed in urban areas. Cotton (grown in the south) and livestock are the 
two most important foreign exchange sources. Although in recent years the 
Malian government and donors have given priority to university training in 
agriculture and social sciences, trained personnel are extremely scarce, and 
the quality of statistical data on the rural economy is limited.
The French colonial strategy called for Mali, with its low population den­
sity and ’ irrigation potential, to become the breadbasket of French West 
Africa. Until the mid-1960s Mali was a food exporter, but since that time 
bad weather and bad policy have slowed agricultural growth. Throughout the 
1970s Mali became increasingly dependent on food imports, particularly food 
aid (MSU-CESA Working Paper, 86-04).
At independence in 1960, Mali opted for a radical socialist development 
path, aimed at achieving rapid economic transformation through extracting 
the economic surplus from agriculture for investment in other sectors.^ The 
Modibo Keita government (1960 to 1968) adopted central planning and set up 
a plethora of state enterprises, including state farms, producer cooperatives, 
and state trading organizations. In 1964 the state created an official grain 
marketing agency, the Office Malien des Produits Agricoles (OPAM), to re­
place a similar colonial entity set up in 1958, and granted OPAM a legal 
monopoly on the grain trade. OPAM sold grain through consumer coopera­
tives, mainly to government employees. Roadblocks were established to limit 
illegal grain movement.
The state fixed official consumer and producer prices for cereals, with 
the stated aim of achieving three seemingly incompatible objectives: increas­
ing rural incomes, providing cheap cereals to the urban areas, and extracting 
a surplus from agriculture to finance state investment in other sectors. 
These objectives could be achieved simultaneously only if productivity grew 
rapidly in the cereal subsector, but lacking basic investment in research and 
rural infrastructure, no productivity gains were forthcoming. In practice, 
the goals of providing cheap grain to the cities and extracting a surplus 
from agriculture dominated, and official producer prices were held low. Be­
cause farmers were unwilling to voluntarily sell sufficient grain to the state 
at these prices, OPAM resorted to forced deliveries and to financing the 
subsidized consumer price through accumulated deficits.
A military coup in 1968 brought the present government to power. The 
new leaders abandoned some of the more radical economic initiatives and in
^This paragraph draws heavily on Humphreys, 1986, pp 1-2.
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early 1969 abolished OPAM’s official monopoly. However, the experiment 
with liberalization was shortlived, as OPAM accused the private merchants 
with whom it had contracted for grain of failing to honor their agreements. 
By the end of 1969, the government reinstated OPAM’s legal monopoly, which 
remained in effect until the PRMC got under way in 1982. In addition, dur­
ing and shortly after the drought of the late 1960s and early 1970s the gov­
ernment set up, often with strong donor support, numerous integrated rural 
development organizations. These "Operations de Developpement Rural" 
(ODRs) and "Actions," were responsible for regional development operations 
and these ODRs often acted as cereal marketing agents of OPAM.
Even during the Modibo Keita regime, OPAM’s monopoly was more fic­
tional than real. Although private trade was repressed, it continued to op­
erate, and OPAM handled only 20-40% of total grain marketings (Humphreys, 
1986, p. 5). Since merely 15% of total production was marketed, only about 
3-6% of total production moved through OPAM at official prices. OPAM’s 
share of rice marketings was much higher than its share of coarse grains 
(millet, maize, and sorghum), as rice was produced largely in irrigation peri­
meters controlled by the ODRs. The repression of private trade, while not 
enough to eliminate it, undoubtedly increased transaction costs. Although 
private trade in cereals remained illegal under the new regime (except for 
the brief experiment with liberalization in 1969), private trade was tolerated, 
but the degree of toleration varied depended on market conditions. Witfr the 
1971 to 1973 drought, OPAM also became the main distribution channel for 
food aid in Mali, a role which it has retained.
Pressure for cereal market liberalization
During the drought years of the early 1970s, Mali imported large amounts of 
grain on both commercial and concessional terms. OPAM was obliged to sell 
the commercial imports at the low official consumer price, which led to an 
increasing budget deficit. To stimulate production after the drought, the 
government raised official producer prices, but without a proportional in­
crease in consumer prices, and forced OPAM to finance the implicit consum­
er subsidies. As a result of these actions and OPAM’s weak financial man­
agement, OPAM’s cumulative budget deficit reached CFAF 20 billion (US$80 
million) by 1976-77, equivalent to three times its annual grain sales (Humph­
reys, 1986, p. 7).
Donor pressure for cereal market reform built during the late 1970s. 
Donors were increasingly reluctant to finance OPAM’s accumulating deficits 
due to concerns about OPAM mismanagement (the U.S. cut off food aid to 
Mali for three years because OPAM was unable to account for previous aid) 
and the perception that OPAM’s official monopoly and the system of official 
prices acted as major disincentives to domestic grain producers. In 1978,
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FAO and the major donors commissioned a study (the de Meel report), the 
conclusions of which reinforced the donors’ concerns and called for a major 
overhaul of grain-marketing policy in Mali. In response to the de Meel re­
port, the government agreed, in March 1981, to a reform program that aimed 
at increasing official producer and consumer prices; liberalizing grain trade 
to include private traders; and improving OPAM’s operating efficiency.
The reforms that became embodied in the PRMC were based on the idea 
of using food aid to finance market reform. In exchange for a series of 
promised reforms, 10 major donors^ pledged multi-year shipments of program 
food aid. This food aid was sold, with the reflow money going into a com­
mon fund controlled by the donors. These funds were to be used to finance 
specific market-restructuring actions agreed to both by the donors (who first 
had to agree unanimously among themselves on a course of action) and the 
government. Donor proposals were initially developed by a donor technical 
committee, debated among the various donors at the political level, and then 
proposed to the Malian government.
Basic assumptions of the reforms
The PRMC was launched with several preconceptions on the part of both the 
donors and the government about how the cereal subsector functioned, but 
with very little empirical information on the structure of production and 
marketing. For example, in 1981 the only time series on market prices of 
cereals (as opposed to official prices) that existed was for retail prices in 
Bamako. Lacking any farm- or rural-market-level price series, it was impos­
sible to have baseline figures against which to measure the impact of lib­
eralization. Furthermore, the initial design of the PRMC made little provi­
sion for strengthening the capacity of the government to monitor the impact 
of the reforms at the farm level, although it did set up a program of mon­
itoring retail prices in the regional capitals.
Five basic assumptions undergirded the initial phase of the PRMC:
o Official producer prices matter. The PRMC program assumed that by 
raising official producer prices, farm-level incentives to produce cer­
eals would increase. This in turn assumed that official prices were 
closely related to the prices farmers actually received for their cereals
^The World Food Programme (which acted as the project secretariat), 
Belgium, Canada, the European Community, France, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, the United States, West Germany, and Austria.
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(which was true for rice produced in large irrigation perimeters, but 
much less true for coarse grains), and that farmers made their cereal 
production decisions primarily based on commercial considerations. It 
also assumed that if farm prices increased, farmers had the capacity 
and were willing to expand production in response to those prices.
o All farmers arc net sellers. The PRMC called for higher producer 
prices to not only increase production but also to raise rural incomes, 
as the donors argued that previous price policy had taxed rural produ­
cers to the benefit of urban consumers. Higher grain prices were seen 
as uniformly helping all farmers, since all farmers were assumed to be 
net sellers of cereals.
o Private traders would quickly seize the opportunities opened up by 
liberalization. The designers of the PRMC implicitly assumed that the 
major constraint facing private grain traders was the anti-merchant 
policies of the state. Once these were lifted, private traders would 
rush in to fill the vacuum left by OPAM’s relinquishing of its official 
monopoly. This assumed that traders would immediately accept the 
reforms at face value and, hence, rapidly invest in expanding their 
operations. It also assumed that traders faced few other constraints 
in expanding their operations, such as a lack of working capital.
o OPAM should continue to exist. At no time did anyone seriously sug­
gest abolishing OPAM. The desire to maintain OPAM reflected both 
the donors’ need to have a Malian government institution through 
which they could channel food aid and recognition of the political 
necessity of protecting certain of OPAM’s privileged clientele, such as 
the army, from higher grain prices. These factors explain the appar­
ent paradox that most of the actions undertaken during the first phase 
of the PRMC were aimed at strengthening OPAM, rather than the pri­
vate sector.
o Mali would continue to experience cereal deficits. This assumption 
had two implications: official prices, if not raised, would always lie 
below market prices and act as a brake on production, and food aid 
would continue to be an appropriate mechanism to fund the reforms.
The experience of the next 6 years showed that all these assumptions, 
except that "OPAM should continue to exist", were to some degree incorrect.
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IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS
To achieve the goals of increasing official producer and consumer prices, 
liberalizing the grain trade, and improving OPAM’s operating efficiency, the 
government, with donor financing, undertook the following actions during the 
6 years from 1981-82 through 1986-87:
Actions with respect to  OPAM
The pressures leading to the implementation of the PRMC evolved mainly 
from the progressively disastrous financial situation of OPAM during the 
1970s. It is therefore not surprising that most of the actions of the program 
aimed explicitly at improving OPAM’s operations and its management of food 
aid, in order to reduce or eliminate its financial losses and the need for 
heavy government budget subsidies. These actions included:
Structural measures
o Reduction of personnel to lower payroll costs. The number of per­
manent employees was reduced by 14.4% between 1981-82 and 1985-86, 
while temporary employment dropped by 97.8% (Table 1). Paradoxical­
ly, the total payroll bill of OPAM increased by 18.1% over this 4-year 
period, mainly because newly hired staff had a higher level of 
training.
o Reduction of the vehicle fleet to minimize fixed costs and contracting 
with private truckers for most regular transport operations. OPAM’s 
truck fleet decreased by almost two-thirds between 1981-82 and 1985-86 
(Table 1), resulting in savings of CFAF 41.7 million (20.5%), on depre­
ciation accounts in 1985-86 compared with 1981-82, in spite of a sig­
nificant increase in the number of OPAM warehouses and amount of 
other equipment during this period.
Operational measures
o Improvement of marketing management. The programme provided and 
supported two expatriates to develop and assist in implementing im­
proved market information and accounting systems for OPAM.
o Increased access to funding. Of the CFAF 11.7 billion reflow funds 
beween 1981-82 and 1985-86, 65% went directly or indirectly to or 
through OPAM (Table 2). The improvement in financing is reflected in 
the agency’s total level of indebtedness, (including short-term loans 
for working capital), which fell by 48% in 1985-86 as compared with 
1981-82-despite a doubling of the volume of coarse grain it traded 
(82,000 mt in 1985-86 vs 41,000 mt in 1981-82). The reduced level of
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Tabic 1. I'volution of OPAM’s personnel and vehicle fleet, 1981 to 1986, Mali.
1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86
Personnel
Total 1869 101S 946 828 7S5
Permanent 869 819 792 820 744
Temporary 500 1% 154 8 11
Number of trucks 64 35 23 23 23
Payroll (CFAF million) 270 285 275 302 319
Depreciation (CFAF million) 200 155 155 157 159
OPAM’s coarse grains
purchases (’000 mt) 41 41 26 25 82
OPAM’s share of coarse
grains (%) 18 20 15 18 28
Source: OPAM’s Report, national seminar on cereal policy (June 1987).
Table 2: Allocation o f PRMC food reflow funds, 1981-87, Mali (CFAF million)
Allocation 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
OPAM deficit coverage 452.0 195.0 408.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IPAM (miscellaneous) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,161.5 0.0
Public sector imports 0.0 0.0 425.0 1,211.0 0.0 0.0
National security stocks 0.0 0.0 725.0 0.0 0.0 726.0
Price support through OPAM 0.0 0.0 244.2 247.8 2,454.0 0.0
ON /  OPAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 896.0 539.2
ORS & ORM /  OPAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 600.0
Office du Niger 
Price Stabilisation and
0.0 0.0 0.0 152.0 0.0 0.0
Regulation Agency (OSRP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 397.0 550.0 0.0
Studies and Consulting 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Private Trader Credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 500.0
Farmer Coop Credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 500.0
Total funds used 1,095.4 2340.5 3,5673 2JS073 1,815.4 11925.0
Total funds available 452.0 195.0 1,8023 2,0073 5,0615 23733
OPAM’s debt 19,769.0 21019.0 6334.0 6345.0 10305.0 NA
OPAM’s interest cost 488.0 466.0 450.0 22.0 211.0 NA
ON = Office du Niger; ORS ;= Operation Riz Segou; ORM = Operation Riz Mopti
Source: PRMC Report, National Seminar on Cereal Policy (June 1987)
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faced, from CFAF 488 million in 1981-82 to CFAF 211 million in 1985-
86.
o Improvement of the overall financial situation. This goal was achieved 
by a combination of actions, which included:
— a reduction of physical grain losses from about 12% in 1981-82 
to 2.5% for domestic grains and 5% for imported grains in 
1985-86 as a result of less but better handling, tighter store 
security, improved conservation techniques, and enforcement of 
penalties for losses under private transport contracts;
— better forward planning to minimize grain shipments;
— a reduction of fixed truck fleet costs;
— a reduction of interest costs following Mali’s entry in the 
West African Monetary Union (WAMU); and
— an increase of the spread between official producer and con­
sumer prices.
These actions reduced OPAM’s annual operating deficits, from CFAF 2.6 
billion in 1980-81 to CFAF 833 million in 1985-6 (Table 3).
Table 3. Evolution of OPAM’s deficit, Mali, 1973-74 to 1985-85 (CFAF mil­
lion)
Period Deficit Cumulated Subsidies
Year Deficit
1973-74 5,922 5,966
1974-75 1,012 6,934 0
1975-76 1,946 8,880 0
1976-77 2,088 10,968 0
1977-78 370 11,338 0
1978-79 2,188 13,526 560
1979-80 4,273 17,799 1,627
1980-81 2,600 20,399 588
1981-82 1,611 22,010 452
1982-83 1,423 23,433 195
1983-84 1,382 24,815 408
1984-85 1,029 25,844 269
1985-86 833 26,677 NA
Source: OPAM’s accounts, PRMC Reports.
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Trade liberalization
The first official step in grain trade liberalization was a decree signed on 
December 24, 1981, which authorized any person or association performing a 
commercial or an agricultural activity-and authorized by the Ministry of 
Commerce to do so--to trade coarse grains (millet, sorghum and maize) all 
over the country during the 1981-82 campaign. This decree was followed by 
two laws in February 1982 that legalized private trade, eliminated OPAM’s 
monopoly rights, and redefined its role as:
o supplying public-interest institutions (the army, police, hospitals, 
schools and penitentiaries) and chronic deficit zones; 
o constituting and managing national security stocks of grain; 
o intervening through buying and selling on the market to enforce of­
ficial producer and consumer prices; 
o managing and distributing food aid.
These official actions led to the elimination of roadblocks, the opening 
of all coarse grain trade to licensed merchants, and the legalization of pri­
vate imports without taxes, quotas or restriction of access to foreign ex­
change. Only private exports of grains remained prohibited. However, the 
relatively good harvests of 1985 and 1986 induced some waivers in the foreign 
grain trade regulations: private traders may now export with special authori­
zation of the Ministry of Commerce, while rice imports are temporarily stop­
ped.
Domestic rice trade liberalisation started much later and only progressive­
ly in 1984-85. Full private trade in the main rice production zone (the 
Office du Niger) was authorized only in 1986-87. The slow pace of domestic 
rice trade liberalization is explained by a combination of factors. Key 
among them were the resistance of the public sector to abandon its control 
over such a strategic commodity for its powerful political clientele (army, 
police and civil servants) and the fear that rice development projects (ODRs) 
would lose their best loan recovery instrument by giving away their monopo­
ly rights on paddy marketing. Thus, paddy trade liberalization occurred only 
after these projects were guaranteed that the rice farmers that they super­
vise remained obligated to deliver to them at least enough rice to repay an­
nual loan instalments.
Changes in official prices
A critical assumption underlying the PRMC price objectives was that official 
grain prices were set to protect the urban consumer at the expense of de­
pressed producer prices, which in turn constituted one of the main disincen­
tives to increasing domestic cereal production for the market. Therefore,
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the PRMC assumed that actions to yield a more adequate pricing system 
should aim at:
o progressively increasing producer prices, taking into account produc­
tion costs and the official prices of neighboring countries to inhibit 
unofficial exports and foster domestic production; and
o gradually increasing consumer prices to bring them in line with both 
official producer prices and private-market consumer prices, to avoid 
the need for consumers subsidies.
These concerns were translated into the programme’s price objectives, as 
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Official producer prices were to increase by 100% 
for coarse grains and 163% for paddy during the 5-year period extending 
from 1981-82 through 1986-87. Over the same period, official consumer prices 
would be raised by 156% for coarse grains and 65% for rice.
However, as shown in the above tables, none of the producer price objec­
tives was met. In fact, by 1986-87, the official producer prices adopted were 
21.4% lower than the objective for coarse grains and 30% below the target 
level for paddy. On the consumer price side, the objectives were met in 
1985-86 and 1986-87 for rice, but fell 13.6% below the target for coarse grains 
in 1986-87. Worse, in real terms, official producer prices were 3.6% lower in 
1985-86 than in 1980-81 for coarse grains, and only 11.1% higher for paddy. 
Official consumer prices in real terms changed by less than 2% for coarse 
grains and fell by 14.4% for rice between 1980-81 and 1984-85.
These outcomes occurred mainly because:
o Even before the PRMC, and in spite of the legal monopoly of OPAM, 
official prices had very little impact on the actual prices producer 
received or consumer paid for coarse grains. Hence, the program 
could not completely ignore the market price level in implementing its 
price policy.
o Partly because of the drought and also because of rising donor pres­
sures, official producer prices had already been increased by 119% for 
coarse grains and 90% for paddy during the 4 years (1977-78 to 1980- 
81) preceding the PRMC. The program could hardly put more upward 
pressure on prices than had the previous drought.
o The quasi-total control of rice production and marketing by state 
agencies, even during almost the entire period of the initial PRMC, 
guaranteed the success of the program with regard to the consumer 
price objectives for rice. Moreover, these price objectives were set 
less ambitiously than those for coarse grains. Whereas the official 
consumer prices for rice had increased by 78.6% during the 4 years 
prior to the PRMC (1977-78 to 1980-81), the PRMC itself sought a total 
increase of 65% over 6 years. The modest targets for nominal price 
increases in rice reflect the fact that rice represents a significant
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Tabic 4. Official producer prices o f coarse grains, 1970-71 to 1986-87, Mali 
(CFAF/kg).
PRMC price Producer prices Producer prices
Period Objectives in current terms in constant terms
(Year) (CFAF/KG) (CFAF/KG) (Base year = 1985)
Coarse
Grains
Paddy Millet/
Sorghum
Maize Paddy Millet/
Sorghum
Maize Paddy
1970-71 NA NA 9 10 13 35 39 49
1971-72 NA NA 9 10 13 3S 37 46
1972-73 NA NA 10 10 13 35 35 43
1973-74 NA NA 10 10 13 33 33 41
1974-75 NA NA 16 16 20 50 50 62
1975-76 NA NA 16 16 20 41 41 51
1976-77 NA NA 16 16 20 37 37 46
1977-78 NA NA 18 18 23 39 39 48
1978-79 NA NA 20 20 25 39 39 49
1979-80 NA NA 25 25 30 44 44 53
1980-81 NA NA 35 35 38 57 57 61
1981-82 40 50 43 45 50 62 62 73
1982-83 46 65 45 45 55 62 62 75
1983-84 53 80 50 50 60 62 62 74
1984-85 60 90 50 50 65 54 54 70
1985-86 70 100 55 55 70 55 55 70
1986-87 70 100 55 55 70 NA NA NA
NA = not applicable
Sources: PRMC, OPAM and Bureau pour le Development Agricole (BDPA).
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Table 5. Consumer prices of coarse grains, Mali, 1970-71 to 1986-87 
(CFAF/kg).
Period
(Year)
PRMC price
Objectives
(CFAF/KG)
Producer prices 
in current terms
Official Private Market3
Official con­
sumer prices in 
constant terms 
(Base year = 
1985)
Coarse Paddy 
Grains
Millet/
Sorghum
Rice Millet/
Sorghum
Rice Millet/
Sorghum
Rice
1970-71 NA NA 18 39 29 57 65 145
1971-72 NA NA 18 40 36 62 61 139
1972-73 NA NA 18 44 58 73 57 144
1973-74 NA NA 18 44 39 79 54 137
1974-75 NA NA 26 56 35 75 67 144
1975-76 NA NA 26 56 36 73 60 130
1976-77 NA NA 26 56 57 97 56 120
1977-78 NA NA 29 69 82 145 56 134
1978-79 NA NA 33 75 54 131 57 133
1979-80 NA NA 39 90 95 153 63 146
1980-81 NA NA 43 100 104 165 62 146
1981-82 53 110 58 115 83 171 79 157
1982-83 68 120 63 125 105 163 78 155
1983-84 81 135 63 125 140 177 67 135
1984-85 95 150 63 125 131 174 63 125
1985-86 110 165 95 165 90 173 NA NA
1986-87 110 165 95 165 NA NA NA NA
aPrivate market prices are for Bamako
Sources: PRMC, OPAM and Bureau pour le Development Agricole (BDPA).
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share of the urban civil servant’s food budget and therefore consti­
tutes a wage good par excellence, and that the prospects for imports 
of cheap rice could not be ignored by the designers of the PRMC.
It is surprising that one of the main recommendations of the de Meel 
report of 1978, namely the substitution of the concept of a price band for 
single panterritorial official buying and selling prices, was not adopted by 
the PRMC. The main reasons for this may be that the single price system 
remained appealing because it is operationally easier to implement, and be­
cause, for alleged equity reasons, die government resisted the idea of geo­
graphical price differences for its employees, who receive roughly the same 
salary all over the country.
Price support efforts
No reliable market data are available to test whether the PRMC had any 
effect on actual producer prices during its first 4 years (1981-82 to 1984-85). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the early 1980s were years of drought and short 
supply logically suggests that the official producer prices remained signifi­
cantly below private market prices. Data do exist on the relationship bet­
ween official prices and market prices at the consumer level, and they in­
dicate that private market prices were 30-55% above official prices for 
coarse grains (23-30% for rice) during the first 5 years of the PRMC (Table 
5).
Furthermore, analysis of the trends and variability in market prices of 
sorghum and millet in Bamako shows that the initial impact of the PRMC 
was a sharp decline in millet and sorghum prices (40% and 52%, respectively, 
in January 1982), mainly due to a significant increase in the total grain sup­
ply. The donors’ enthusiasm for the program resulted in an increase of food 
aid by 60% in 1982, despite a 21% increase of domestic production, so that 
average per capita availability of grain rose by 21% in 1982 over 1981. How­
ever, the combined effects of the drought of the early 1980s and the legali­
zation of private trade in coarse grains led to an adjustment process by 
which market prices rose more rapidly during the first 4 years of the PRMC 
than over the 4-year period prior to the program (MSU-CESA Working Paper 
86- 02).
The first year during which the capacity of the PRMC to support produ­
cer prices was put to a true test was in 1985-86 when, thanks to relatively 
good rainfall, domestic coarse grain production was 72% above the average of 
the first 4 years of the program. OPAM initially planned to purchase 21,300 
mt of coarse grains, but this quickly proved to be too small to affect market 
prices. The PRMC donor community along with the banking system then 
stepped in to support OPAM financially, enabling it to buy a total of 82,000 
mt of millet, sorghum, and maize. This record-level intervention, which
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amounted to CFAF 4.5 billion at official producer prices, had a clear impact 
on private-market producer prices, which remained less than 10% below the 
official target of CFAF 55/kg even in the most productive southern zones 
during the 3 to 4 months (December 1985 to March 1986) of official buying 
operations (Fig. 1). By March, however, OPAM ran out of funds and 
retreated from the market, leading prices to fall precipitously (MSU-CESA, 
Working Paper No. 86-03).
After OPAM’s withdrawal from the market, rural market prices in the 
CMDT zone (the major cereal surplus area of the country) never again 
reached the level of CFAF 50/kg during the 1985-86 crop year (Table 6 and 
Fig. 1). OPAM’s modest overall impact on prices was partly due to the fact 
that official purchases, despite their high absolute volume, represented mere­
ly 5% of total domestic coarse grain production and 28% of total marketed 
quantities in 1985-86.
Furthermore, not all farmers were positively affected by the price support 
intervention in 1985-86. Analysis of farmer transaction data (Tables 7 and 8) 
shows that even in the two most southerly rural development zones (the 
CMDT and OHV), only 48% of the farms were net sellers of coarse grains 
versus 39% who were net buyers in 1985-86 (MSU-CESA, Working Paper No. 
87-02). Almost 92% of net sales were accounted for by the top 30% of farms 
units; and 74% of the net sales came from the south of the two zones as 
compared with 26% in the north. Moreover, farms with a full set of animal 
traction equipment, representing 36% of the total farm population surveyed, 
accounted for 70% of total net sales, while semi-equipped farms (35%) and 
the non-equipped farms (29%) accounted for 21% and 9% of all net sales, 
respectively. Finally, net sellers were concentrated in the south (59%) and 
among fully or semi-equipped farms (53% and 29%), while net buyers were 
mostly found in the north (70%) and among semi-equipped and non-equipped 
farms (42% and 39%).
From the same analysis, it appears that in the OHV zone, where cash 
crop production is low, 80% of farmers’ coarse grain sales occurred during 
the 5 months immediately following harvest (November-March). The main 
motivation for selling at this time, in spite of low prices, was to pay head 
taxes, which are due by May 31 of each year. Tax payments were cited as 
the number one reason for sales by 73% of all sellers interviewed in this 
zone.** Taking all these facts into account, it becomes obvious that the
^In the cotton zone (CMDT), most coarse grain sellers pay their taxes 
out of cotton revenues, which allows these farmers to time their grain sales 
later in the season, when prices are higher.
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FIGURE 1 PRODUCER CEREAL PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES F.CFA/KG —  SOUTH CMDT
PERIOD (YEAR & MONTH)
O MILLET + SORGHUM 0 MAIZE
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Table 6: Rural 
(CTAF/kg)a
market producer prices o f coarse grains, Mali, 1985 to 1987
Period
(month)
MILLET SORGHUM MAIZE
South
CMDT
North
CMDT
South
CMDT
North
CMDT
South
CMDT
North
CMDT
Oct. 1985 50.0 55.0 40.0 50.0 275 27.5
Nov. 1985 50.0 50.0 41.5 45.0 35.0 30.0
Dec. 1985 50.5 52.5 50.2 52.5 46.2 52.6
Jan. 1986 52.4 52.8 54.2 51.3 51.0 51.0
Feb. 1986 52.1 50.7 51.6 50.6 48.4 51.6
Mar. 1986 50.1 53.0 50.4 51.5 36.5 48.9
Apr. 1986 44.8 45.3 42.3 46.0 30.8 35.0
May. 1986 46.6 41.8 41.9 42.0 31.4 NA
Jun. 1986 42.2 39.2 39.8 39.6 28.2 32.1
Jul. 1986 47.4 46.0 48.4 46.2 34.1 27.9Aug. 1986 49.3 48.8 47.1 49.5 33.3 35.0
Sep. 1986 46.1 44.3 43.5 45.0 26.9 24.1Oct. 1986 40.1 32.0 37.9 30.8 20.9 20.0
Nov. 1986 32.0 25.1 28.3 26.8 17.4 22.5Dec. 1986 29.5 26.4 24.9 25.9 19.4 275
Jan. 1987 25.1 25.5 25.1 25.4 18.0 15.6Feb. 1987 24.7 20.4 24.5 23.9 17.4 15.0
Mar. 1987 24.7 20.3 24.0 24.6 18.2 NAApr. 1987 28.4 27.6 28.1 29.2 20.3 15.0
May. 1987 32.2 32.7 29.8 32.2 25.9 18.8Jun. 1987 34.0 32.1 32.8 32.4 29.0 20.0
Jul. 1987 40.5 42.6 40.9 43.2 32.9 NA
jjiuci, = not appncaoie.
Source: MSU-CESA Food Security Project (1985 to 1987).
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Tabic 7. Coarse Grain sales, Mali, 1985-86.
ZONIiS Farms Average Production Total
SUB-ZONES Selling Sales per Sold Net Sales
STRATA Farm
(%) (kg) (%) (%)
South - CMDT 68.8 457 10.4 70.4
North - CMDT 64.6 166 5.6 19.9
South - OHV 56.3 49 3.0 3.2
North - OHV 50.0 119 8.9 6.5
CMDT 7 OHV By stratum
Equipped farms 79.9 433 9.0 70.4
Semi-equipped non def. 77.3 241 7.3 18.0
Semi-equipped deficit 45.4 56 3.3 2.6
Non-equipped farms 52.9 89 7.9 9.0
Source: MSU-CESA Food Security Project, farm surveys (1985-86).
Table 8. Concentration o f coarse grain sales, survey areas, Mali, 1985-86.
GROSS SALES NET SALES
Percent 
of farms
Percent 
of sales
Percent 
of farms
Percent 
of sales
4.7 36.1 4.7 41.0
9.9 49.9 9.9 555
14.9 60.9 14.9 67.7
20.4 69.8 20.4 77.6
24.9 67.4 24.9 84.7
30.1 84.4 30.1 91.9
35.3 89.9 34.9 95.9
39.7 93.0 40.0 985
45.1 955 45.0 99.7
49.9 97.7 47.6 100.0
55.1 99.1 NA NA
59.9 99.9 NA NA
64.3 100.0 NA NA
Source: MSU-CESA Food Security Project, farm surveys (1985-86).
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price support effort mostly benefited fully and semi-equipped farmers of the 
cotton producing southern zones; while hurting a large number of 
semi-equipped farms and almost all non-equipped farms in the non-cotton 
producing zones, where most farmers are net buyers—even in a good rainfall
year such as 1985-86.
Finally, the official intervention of OPAM to support producer prices in 
1985-86 induced a distortion in the seasonal pattern of prices (Fig 1). Mar­
ket producer prices rose to and remained around CFAF 50/kg during a few 
months of the immediate postharvest period when OPAM was actively buying, 
then dropped to levels which never reached the December-March peak for 
the rest of the campaign. This distortion created a significant disincentive 
to private traders’ investment in grain storage which, combined with their 
very limited access to formal credit, discouraged private storage (MSU-CESA, 
Working Papers No. 86-04 and 86-05). Hence, the way the PRMC attempted 
to meet its price support objective conflicted with its goal of seeking more 
active private involvement in domestic grain marketing.
OPAM’s market intervention in 1986-87 was much more limited than in
1985- 86 because of inflexibility in the rules governing its commercial opera­
tions. Due to the bumper harvest, market prices were significantly below 
official prices at the consumer level throughout 1985-86. Nonetheless, OPAM 
was forced to sell at the official price. Because OPAM found few customers 
at the official price, most of its working capital was tied up in unsold grain 
stocks, which prevented the grain board from making significant purchases in
1986- 87.-* OPAM’s actions in 1986-87 included only the purchase of 10,000 mt 
of coarse grains to replenish the national cereals security stock.
Direct actions with the private sector
Most observers agree that the PRMC did very little in terms of actions 
aimed at directly improving the private sector’s capacity to market cereals 
efficiently. This fact is nicely stated in a USAID consulting assessment, 
which notes that "the ambiguity of policy reform is reflected in the ironic 
situation in which the PRMC program—with a major focus on increasing pri-
^Part of the pressure to sell only at the official price came from the 
PRMC donors, who did not want losses on lower-priced sales to show up on 
OPAM’s books and make the programme look as though it was not achieving 
its aim of improving OPAM’s efficiency. Although OPAM was actually losing 
money on storing the grain, OPAM’s balance sheet did not reflect these 
losses, because the inventory was valued at the unrealistically high official 
consumer price.
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vate sector participation in a freer cereals trade--has spent most of its ex­
patriate staff time and financial resources attempting to keep the state trade 
agency afloat" (Wilcock, Roth, and Haykin, 1987).
This contention is confirmed by the fact that OPAM benefited directly or 
indirectly from 65% of all PRMC food aid reflow money from 1981-82 to 1985- 
86, in addition to two full-time expatriate experts. Furthermore, thanks to 
the donors’ financial commitment, the state grain marketing agency’s market 
share rose to 28% in 1985-86, a level not reached since 1978-79, and an all- 
time record in terms of the quantity of coarse grains purchased by the of­
ficial system.
With the exception of the legalization of the private trade, the PRMC 
undertook virtually no direct activity in favor of private grain merchants or 
producer associations before the 1986-87 campaign. The benefits of liberali­
zation gained by the private traders included more freedom of action; the 
subsequent increase in the scale of their activities resulting in reduced oper­
ating costs (especially reduced transaction costs) and possibly higher profits. 
Meanwhile, MSU-CESA Food Security research data indicate that in 1986, 63% 
of coarse grain wholesalers in four major trading cities (Bamako, Mopti, 
Sikasso and Koutiala) complained about the low level of their working capital 
and their limited access to formal financing institutions; 55% of them pleaded 
for a reduction in their business taxes, which were the equivalent of 55% of
their net revenue; and 15% reported the search for financing to acquire
trucks or warehouses as their major concern. In addition, almost 25% of 
these wholesalers complained about the cost incurred due to frequent public 
inspections by the controle economique, resulting often in arbitrary and un­
official fines.
With the good harvests of 1986, which resulted from a second good rainy 
season in a row, the PRMC policy makers realized that because of 
constraints in both the public and the private marketing channels, the Mal­
ian cereal market was facing gridlock. By fixing official consumer prices 
too far above market clearing prices, the state put OPAM in a situation 
where it could hardly sell any of the grain it bought in 1985-86. With its
huge carryover stocks and resulting debt (CFAF 10.3 billion), OPAM had
neither available storage space nor the required financial capacity to inter­
vene effectively in a collapsing coarse grain market in 1986-87. Further­
more, because of limited financial capacity and uncertainty about what OPAM 
would do with its stocks, private traders were both neither able nor unwil­
ling to buy and stock large quantities of grain in anticipation of a seasonal 
price rise.
To at least partially solve the problem, the PRMC donor community 
agreed to support a credit program of CFAF 1.0 billion, half for private tra­
ders (and implemented via private banks and the Chamber of Commerce and
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Industry), and half in favor of village producer associations. For the private 
merchants, the banking system was requested to match the PRMC’s CFAF 
500 million with an equal amount, but it was forbidden to do so by the Cen­
tral Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which had imposed an overall 
limit on credit creation by commercial banks in order to curb inflation. 
Therefore, this first attempt at direct action to help private cereal market 
agents was modest in its focus and impact. Indeed, the credit program could 
cover merely 14,000 mt at the wholesale level and an additional 25,000 mt at 
the village association level.** These 39,000 mt, when added to the 10,000 mt 
purchased by OPAM with PRMC funds for the national security stock, repre­
sent approximately 16% of the marketable surplus of 300,000 mt of coarse 
grains in 1986-87.
Beside the modest level of financing, private merchants complained about 
the delay in availability of funds at the bank-level (the loan process started 
only in March, 4 months after harvest); the long and slow administrative 
procedures of loan processing; the provision of funds in small disbursements, 
which did not permit traders to finance large-scale operations; and the non­
involvement of the Chamber of Commerce in loan application procesing. 
This test credit program is presently under evaluation by the MSU-CESA 
Food Security project and USAID in order to generate useful information and 
recommendations for reshaping it for the next campaign (1987-88).
PRMC program monitoring
Most of the shortfalls of the PRMC can be blamed on the weak empirical 
basis upon which the program was designed, implemented, and periodically 
assessed. In designing the program, the government and the donors had very 
few studies on the structure, conduct and performance of the Malian cereals 
market on which they could draw. Moreover, most of the previous reports 
and studies were heavily biased toward the description of the state market­
ing system and provided very little insight into the private market. Hence, 
almost all the initial package of actions of the PRMC was defined not on 
the basis of facts but on assumptions about how the private trade was or­
ganized, how it operated, and how it performed.
Nevertheless, the PRMC donor group made a remarkable effort to monitor 
the program throughout its implementation. On an ad hoc basis, the donor 
Technical Committee met almost weekly to discuss program progress and
**These quantities are estimated by dividing the total loan funds 
available for each component by the post-harvest prices at both the 
wholesaler and village levels in the major cereals producing zone.
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reach agrccmcnl on how to reshape current activities and define new lines 
of intervention. In addition, many donors sponsored annual assessment and 
evaluation missions, carried out by outside consultants over the 6-year period 
(1981-82 to 1986-87), which led many observers to note that the PRMC is 
doubtlessly among the most evaluated programs in Africa!
However, these ad hoc and outside evaluation efforts could not generate 
the appropriate data required for a thorough monitoring of the program. 
The major weakness of the monitoring process was that except for consumer 
price data, which are collected monthly in all regional capitals and each 10 
days in Bamako, the program monitoring teams had practically no usable data 
on the private market until 1985. The lack of basic data on the private cer­
eals market explains in large part the weakness of most PRMC evaluation 
reports. For instance, because no data are available on actual producer pri­
ces prior to 1985, it is impossible to assess the impact of the program on 
farmers’ income during its first four years (1981-82 to 1984-85).
It was only in 1985 that the Canadians and Americans decided, as an add­
itional contribution to their participation in the policy reform process, to 
support major data collection and analysis activities to inform the PRMC. 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided an agricul­
tural economist who not only served as Canada’s representative on the Tech­
nical Committee, but also undertook primary data collection in a few major 
rural markets in the administrative subdivision of Diola (between Bamako and 
Scgou), as well as case studies of the operations of a few private grain 
wholesalers in Bamako. This effort generated weekly producer price data 
(though very limited geographically) and a few analyses and reports based on 
primary data on private market channels and behavior (Gagnon, 1986).
The most important monitoring-related research activity to date was in­
itiated in 1985 through the MSU-USAID Food Security in Africa Cooperative 
Agreement which, in Mali, was implemented as a joint project with Mali’s 
National Commission for the Oversight and Evaluation of the Food Strategy 
(CESA). The aim of the MSU-CESA research was to develop a better under­
standing of the structure, conduct and performance of the private market for 
domestic coarse grains and, in so doing, empirically test some of the major 
assumptions underlying the PRMC. Since the inception of this research pro­
ject in October 1985, the research team has collected, processed, analyzed 
and disseminated basic information on the private market for coarse grains.
The data generated by the MSU-CESA Food Security Project cover a 
large set of market conduct and performance indicators, including:
o monthly coarse grain transactions (sales, purchases, barters and gifts) 
for a sample of 190 farmers distributed among 16 villages in 4 rainfall 
subzones in the south of the country the (CMDT and OHV zones);
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o weekly transaction data for the main rural market of each of the 4 
subzones; and
o monthly transaction data for a sample of 101 grain wholesalers in 4 
major cities (Bamako, Mopti, Sikasso and Koutiala).
In addition, several one-shot surveys have been carried out to gather 
information on farmers’ strategies for coping with their own food security 
(available resources, activities and means to meet food needs, major 
constraints that jeopardize their food situation, major policy and technologi­
cal factors that enhance their food security, etc.); traders’ resources, con­
straints, and strategic behavior, especially in response to the risk and uncer­
tainty that traders face from unexpected policy changes and supply variabil­
ity; and the interactive effects of different macro-level policies (fiscal, cre­
dit, pricing, extension, etc.), on both traders’ and farmers’ strategics with 
respect to their production and marketing activities.
The information and analyses from this project flowed directly to the 
PRMC policy makers through the USAID representative to the PRMC Techni­
cal Committee, regular meetings between the project’s researchers and this 
committee, periodic debates organized around working papers with CESA, 
meetings with outside consultants, and participation of the project’s lead 
researcher in national and international seminars and workshops on cereals 
policy.
EV ALUATION OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECOND PHASE 
OF THE PRMC AND FOR MARKET REFORMS 
ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA
Achievements of the first phase of the PRMC
The PRMC achieved encouraging results during the six years of its initial 
implementation phase; however it was not a complete success. Despite the 
progressive liberalization of domestic trade and imports of cereals, many 
aspects of the private trade remain heavily regulated: freedom of entry in 
grain trade is restricted to some extent by the demanding requirements that 
an individual must meet to obtain a trading license (minimum bank deposit, 
proper storage, etc.); exports require licensing under a very long and cum­
bersome administrative process; and private traders’ access to formal financ­
ing is severely limited.
('liven the lack of data on producer prices in the private market before 
PRMC and during the first 4 years of the program, it is virtually impossible 
to quantify the impact of the policy reform on farmers’ incomes. One may 
speculate that by increasing the number of merchants buying cereals from 
producers, the market liberalization increased competition among buyers, with
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the consequence of increasing producer prices to some extent. Similarly, 
during the deficit years of 1981-82 and 1984-85, deficit producers probably 
benefited directly or indirectly from the effect of food aid on consumer pri­
ces. In the bumper crop year of 1985-86, strong financial support by the 
donors allowed OPAM to buy considerable quantities of cereals at official 
prices, which were higher than prevailing market prices. This led to a 
transfer of income from the donors to those surplus producers who sold dur­
ing the OPAM buying campaign.
Of all the parties concerned, the state appears to have gained the most 
from the activities of the PRMC during its initial phase. OPAM benefited 
from the sales of food aid by using the reflow money to cover its annual 
deficits and to finance its price support operations. It was also the recip­
ient of almost all the technical assistance provided by the donors. OPAM 
also gained from the increase in its margins permitted by the revision of the 
official price schedules. In addition to its actions toward OPAM, the PRMC 
also provided financial support to other public agencies, such as the rice 
producing Office du Niger and the Price Stabilization and Regulation Office 
(OSRP).
The PRMC increased consumers’ access to cereals at lower prices, thanks 
to the combination of greater competition among private traders, freer move­
ment of cereals within the country, the liberalization of imports, and the 
increase and improved coordination of the food aid provided by the donor 
group supporting the program.
However, mainly due to design and implementation shortfalls, many prob­
lems remain to be tackled if the performance of the whole system is to im­
prove. First, greater program and policy flexibility is needed at several lev­
els:
o Administrative and regulatory burdens (e.g., in obtaining export clear­
ances) continue to inhibit private traders’ ability to adjust quickly to 
volatile market conditions. The volatility of the markets results in 
part from uncertainty about what actions the public sector is planning 
to take in these markets.
o Official prices, if retained at all, need to be linked to market prices, 
particularly if OPAM is constrained to buy and sell at official prices. 
Otherwise, during years of short harvests, such as 1984-85, market 
prices will lie above official prices, creating few incentives for produ­
cers to sell to OPAM but increasing the incentives for consumers to 
try to buy from OPAM at the subsidized official consumer price. In 
years of good harvests, such as 1985-86, just the opposite occurs. In 
both cases, OPAM loses.
o Flexibility is needed with respect to the financing of the PRMC itself. 
Whereas using food aid to finance cereal market reform may make
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sense in years of substantial production shortfalls, as occurred during 
the first 4 years of the project, it creates disincentives for both 
farmers and private traders in years of good harvests, when market 
prices are already likely to be depressed-even in the absence of in­
flows of food aid. The donors have begun to address this problem; in 
1987, the US contributed US$1 million in cash to the PRMC in lieu of 
food aid.
Second, private traders face severe financial constraints that prevent 
them from ’undertaking larger scale cost-saving operations and investing in 
means to achieve better vertical coordination of their activities, especially 
improved transportation and storage facilities. They also lack adequate mar­
ket information that would enable them to plan their business operations 
more effectively, such as timely information on market prices; public and 
private stocks; timing and level of planned public-sector purchases and sales; 
domestic production; current and projected imports; the place, timing, and 
level of nongovernmental organizations’ food aid interventions; and ongoing 
changes in current policy directions.
Third, despite remarkable progress, OPAM’s costs remain high. In fact, 
significant savings were made only on fixed costs, due mainly to the sharp 
reductions in the agency’s truck fleet and in interest costs, thanks to the 
PRMC funding. Payroll costs increased both in absolute and relative terms 
during the first 5 years of the program (Table 9). OPAM now faces the
Tabic 9: Evolution o f OPAMs cost structure, Mali (1980-81 to  1985-86).
Period
(year)
Total
Costs
(CFAF
million)
Percentage share of:
Payroll
Costs
Deprec­
iation
Payroll 
& deprec­
iation
Trans­
port
costs
Interest
costs
1980-1981 2,046 12.8 11.3 24.1 30.5 24.6
1981-1982 1,965 13.7 10.2 24.0 30.7 24.9
1982-1983 1,877 15.2 8.3 23.5 27.9 24.8
1983-1984 1,708 16.1 9.1 25.2 21.5 26.3
1984-1985 1,141 6.6 13.4 40.0 21.0 1.9
1985-1986 1,825 16.8 8.7 25.5 38.6 15.2
Source: OPAM’s accounts, PRMC reports.
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problem of being simultaneously overstaffed quantitatively and understaffed 
qualitatively. It still lacks the analytic capacity to properly plan and man­
age its activities.
Fourth, the combination of price supports and fiscal policies (head taxes) 
reduced the food security of more than one-third of the farmers in the 
major cereals producing region who are net grain buyers. These include 
mainly small farm households with little or no animal traction equipment, 
which may have the highest propensity to invest in farming in order to raise 
their agricultural productivity. However, they are unable to do so, because 
they find themselves in a poverty trap where they have to rely heavily on 
their small cereal production to pay taxes and loans at harvest time, and 
rebuy cereal at higher prices (often on credit) to feed themselves during the 
hungry season. Therefore, this class of farmer is never in a position to 
adopt a sales strategy that would allow them to maximize their income and 
save.
Fifth, the above remark points out a more general constraint to relying 
solely on market liberalization to overcome poverty and hunger problems; 
namely that a large number of urban and rural consumers, including small 
wage earners, unemployed rural migrants, and many farmers, lack adequate 
income to assure access to the cereals market. The full potential of the 
PRMC is unlikely to be achieved unless the program is accompanied by ef­
forts to increase incomes and hence the effective demand for cereals. This 
requires attention to increasing productivity in food, cash-crop, and livestock 
production; promotion of non-farm enterprises; and urban job creation. The 
synergies between food crop production and other enterprises require par­
ticular attention; the findings in Mali indicate clearly that rural household 
food security was highest among tho^e families with greatest involvement in 
cotton production and off-farm activities.
Implications for the second phase of the PRMC and the design and imple­
mentation of marketing policy reforms elsewhere in Africa 
The PRMC was initially funded for 5 years, from 1982 through 1986. In 1986 
the donors agreed to a 3-year extension of the program, through 1989. What 
lessons can be drawn from the experience of the first phase for subsequent 
PRMC activities and for similar programs elsewhere in Africa?
The most apparent lesson that emerges is the critical importance of hav­
ing reliable knowledge about how the food system works in order to design 
effective food policies. The lack of empirical information on the cereals 
subsector was clearly one of the major weaknesses during the initial design 
of the PRMC and the first 4 years of implementation. Without such infor­
mation, it was impossible to test the basic assumptions on which the project 
was based concerning private traders’ capacity to respond to opportunities
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opened up by liberalization, farmers’ net selling positions, merchants and 
farmers’ reactions to prices, their market related constraints, etc. Most of 
the initial assumptions ended up being wrong to some degree, necessitating 
ongoing modification of the program.
The required understanding of the food system is unlikely to be obtained 
by relying solely on short-term external consultants. Not only arc external 
consultants often unaware of many of the sublcties of how the local food 
systems work, but also they arc constrained to work with the existing data 
base, which is often inadequate. Without investing in increasing the in dom­
estic capacity to generate and analyze information on the food system, poli­
cies will continue to be made largely out of ignorance.
The experience of the PRMC suggests that the following types of infor­
mation are critical in designing successful market liberalizations and related 
reforms:
o Prices paid and received at various stages in the subsector.
o Cost data at various stages in the subsector, which, when combined 
with the price data and data on trader practices, allow estimation of 
traders’ margins.
o Information on the likely incidence of proposed policies. For example, 
in evaluating a proposed price support program it is critical to know 
what proportion of farmers are net sellers, how many arc net buyers, 
and what are the characteristics and sales strategics of each.
o Enough information on farmers’ and traders’ strategics and constraints 
to interpret observed fluctuations in prices and quantities sold. For 
example, what influence do tax obligations have on farmers’ seasonal 
sales strategies and hence the seasonal pattern of prices? What are 
the determinants of traders’ storage strategies? This information is 
also critical in assessing how market participants will react to policy 
changes.
Research needs to focus on testing the basic assumptions underlying the 
reforms. At the same time, researchers must to be highly selective in de­
termining which variables to observe, as it is easy to fall into the trap of 
collecting too much data, which prevents timely analysis and feedback to 
policy makers.
In Mali, as in most African countries, the question of what role the state 
can and should play in cereal market stabilization remains an important topic 
for future research. Instability in these markets probably discourages farmer 
and trader investment and specialization in the grain subsector, but given 
the very limited financial resources of most African countries and the thin­
ness of the markets, the feasibility of running a price support program 
through grain board purchases is highly questionable. Despite strong donor 
support, OPAM’s attempts at enforcing an official producer price above the
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market price were largely unsuccessful. What alternative roles the state, 
with its very limited resources, could play in reducing the volatility of cer­
eals markets remains an area for both theoretical and empirical investigation.
The PRMC experience also points out that generating empirical informa­
tion to inform the policy reform process involves much more than just data 
collection and analysis. Considerable effort has to be invested in creating 
channels to feed back research findings in a timely way to policy makers. 
Elaborate reports presented after 2 years of analysis are frequently useless 
to policy makers, as the issues they analyze are often out of date. In addi­
tion to emphasizing timely analysis (which has important implications for the 
types and amount of data collected), researchers may initially have to devote 
considerable energy to "selling" their results. In Mali, there was no trad­
ition of issuing preliminary results in the form of working papers, and Mal­
ian policy makers were at first skepitical of these reports and slower than 
the donor Technical Committee to grasp the usefulness of their findings for 
policy design. However, after the project director spent considerable time 
interacting with members of the Malian Food Strategy Commission Malian 
policy makers became strong advocates of the need to foster local research 
capacity to inform policy.
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